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 Geography gives strategy its context� Secure from land invasion, Great Brit-ain and later the United States employed a distinctive form of sea power 
to defeat their adversaries� Both used their navies to control sea-lanes and vital 
choke points and to apply direct pressure along enemy coastlines� Through their 
dominance of the oceans they were able to shape the political and economic order 
of the world� It is fair to say that what amounts to the Anglo-American school of 
naval power has demonstrated its efficacy time after time: over the past 250 years 
these two powers have, singly or together, and always with other allies, defeated 
every opponent that has attempted to change that order� 
An alternative school of naval thought, one rooted in coastal defense, follows 
an asymmetric path intended to enable the weak to take down the strong� This 
approach to naval warfare has always sought to capitalize on leading-edge tech-
nology while drawing inspiration from French tactics of guerre de course (with 
their origins in piracy and privateering), the Russian Revolution, and “people’s 
war” in China� In contrast to the oceanic outlook of the Anglo-American tradi-
tion, this approach focuses on operations in the littorals and command of the sea 
in those waters alone� It yokes the operational and tactical offense to the strategic 
defense� It eschews fleet-on-fleet engagement and refuses frontal battle� Instead 
it seeks to wear down the opponent while channeling enemy forces as they ap-
proach the shoreline, forcing them to attack coastal and inland positions from 
unfamiliar seas� The aim is to make the intruder vulnerable to a counterattack 
that shifts the initiative to the defender� It extracts advantage from geography� For 
instance, China’s control over Asian waters and major shipping lanes would give 
Beijing substantial global leverage�
Evolution in French, Soviet, and Chinese Naval Thought
Martin N. Murphy and Toshi Yoshihara
FIGHTING THE NAVAL HEGEMON
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For over a century, this tradition of naval thought has evolved through vari-
ous iterations in France, the Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of China, 
while retaining its essential features� However, the unique geopolitical contexts, 
cultural attitudes, and economic circumstances produced variation in how these 
three states employed sea power� This alternative approach to naval warfare 
began life in late-nineteenth-century France, where, known as the Jeune École, 
it arose as a counter to British naval strategy� It reemerged in the Soviet Union 
during the 1920s, when the revolutionary government felt especially vulnerable 
to foreign intervention and was in no position to build a battle fleet� There it 
mutated on contact with revolutionary war experience, becoming known as the 
“Young School” and emerging as an alternative to Alfred Thayer Mahan’s “com-
mand of the sea” theory� From there it was transmitted to the People’s Republic, 
where several of its attributes have persisted in Chinese naval doctrine� 
Breaking from the past, however, China today can compete economically with 
the United States, the leading maritime power, even as it holds on to its preference 
for waging asymmetric warfare at sea� By contrast, neither France nor the Soviet 
Union possessed the wherewithal to challenge seriously the economic position of 
the naval hegemons of their respective eras� The prospect in China of alignment 
of economic prowess with unorthodox ideas about naval combat is a potentially 
new phenomenon worthy of close attention by the United States� While China is 
at the forefront of this alternative school in the twenty-first century, its ideas also 
animate the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy and exert a strong influ-
ence on the Russian navy� Notably, Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing are ambivalent 
about, if not hostile to, American primacy at sea, and their navies have begun 
to cooperate with each other�1 It is thus very likely that this alternative tradition 
will live on and be felt across the littorals of Eurasia in the coming years, posing 
multiple, yet varied, challenges to U�S� naval predominance� 
The Soviet Young School and Mao’s “people’s war” virtually simultaneously 
shaped the early development of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)� 
While the two theories clearly overlapped, however, they represented separate 
sources of influence on Chinese naval strategy and tactics�2 In both France and 
the Soviet Union, doctrines that stressed the importance of the battle fleet even-
tually enveloped this alternative naval school of thought� In China, this tradition 
remains energetic and influential alongside the growth of a more conventional 
naval force� Whether such coexistence will continue remains unclear� Indeed, 
Chinese strategists have debated the future course of naval doctrine for decades� 
In an earlier manifestation of this discourse, one group argued that “people’s war” 
theory was irrelevant at sea against technologically sophisticated enemies such as 
the United States and Japan� Another view, while agreeing that the Chinese navy 
should no longer serve exclusively as the guardian of the army’s coastal flank, 
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insisted that people’s war at sea simply needed to be adapted to “new historical” 
conditions�3 
A similar debate now surrounds the PLAN’s recent ascent at sea and its fu-
ture implications� Will the naval service follow the Anglo-American model of 
sea power and develop a globe-straddling blue-water navy capable of waging 
transoceanic campaigns? Or will the PLAN focus on homeland defense, staying 
true to its longstanding core identity, even as it becomes more modern, lethal, 
and expeditionary? Or will the Chinese navy chart a unique path that reflects the 
imperatives peculiar to Beijing’s evolving circumstances? As the PLAN’s growth 
continues to tilt the naval balance of power, these questions are gaining policy 
urgency in Washington and across Asian capitals� The PLAN’s current naval 
strategy, which enlarges China’s maritime defense perimeter farther out to open 
waters, is an outgrowth of rather than a break with its formative period, when 
the ideas of the alternative school took root� Consequently, the United States and 
other seafaring regional powers must remain attentive to the continuing vibrancy 
of this tradition in China and its implications for littoral warfare in Asia�
THE JEUNE ÉCOLE: HOW THE WEAK CAN DEFEAT THE STRONG 
The Jeune École went through two evolutions� The first laid its primary empha-
sis on commerce war, linked secondarily to coastal defense; the second merged 
these priorities� Both evolutions stressed the importance of technology, the use 
of ship speed and numbers, and the redundancy of large battle fleets� Both were 
responses to constrained naval budgets� 
The theory as a whole is associated indelibly with Vice Admiral Hyacinthe-
Laurent-Théophile Aube, who first articulated the school’s basic ideas in the 
1870s before serving as France’s minister of marine 1886–87�4 Aube was a man 
of the colonies� When he returned to France in 1881 he brought with him the 
adventurous colonial spirit and sided with a group of young, reform-minded 
officers who favored his ideas� These were the Jeune École—the Young School� 
The traditionalists who opposed them became known eventually as the “French 
School�” Once Alfred Thayer Mahan in the United States began to publish, they 
worked to adapt his thinking to France’s position as a secondary naval power�
Aube became the intellectual driving force behind the Jeune École, along 
with a young journalist, Gabriel Charmes, with whom he worked closely until 
Charmes’s death early in Aube’s term as minister� However, its basic features had 
been delineated in the late 1860s by Captain Richild Grivel, who suggested that 
France, as the inferior power with respect to Britain, should pursue commerce 
war (guerre de course) and use its battle fleet (in guerre d’escadre) only against 
enemies inferior to itself�5 
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Military power derives directly from economic power� France’s economy dur-
ing the years running up to World War I was not weak, but it was never as strong 
as that of Great Britain or, eventually, Germany� France’s navy, consequently, al-
ways struggled to match those of its principal rivals, a situation that worsened in 
the period between Grivel and Aube� In 1870–71 France lost the Franco-Prussian 
War� The army of the newly created German Empire became France’s princi-
pal enemy and France’s army the recipient of the bulk of French state defense 
expenditure� Consequently, 
the French navy had to find 
another way to compete at sea 
with Britain and, eventually, 
Germany; the result was a vig-
orous and, some have argued, 
destructive and politicized de- 
bate�6 Aube’s position was that while the naval high command might argue for a 
traditional, battleship-heavy navy to meet Britain on the best affordable terms, 
such fleet-on-fleet engagements were now rare and posed much greater risk to 
the inferior power than to the superior� He argued that the weaker side must 
search out alternative tactics, exploit new technology, and decline to engage the 
superior enemy until it became no longer numerically inferior� 
Strategies for dealing with a superior naval power have traditionally fallen into 
two categories� One involves “risk fleets,” otherwise known as “fleets in being,” 
forces structured similarly to the superior power’s but smaller� In the modern age, 
the Imperial German Navy assembled by Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz is the classic 
example� The second comprises “coastal-defense fleets,” bringing together land-
based capabilities, such as forts and artillery, with minefields, patrol boats, and 
submarines, as assembled in various periods by France, the Soviet Union, and 
China� The Jeune École supported coastal-defense measures but never argued for 
a risk fleet, which would aim eventually to confront the opponent’s main battle 
fleet, if and when a favorable opportunity occurred� 
Instead, the Jeune École took aim at the enemy’s economic power and social 
stability, seeing trade as Britain’s greatest strategic weakness�7 British naval exer-
cises suggested that this assessment was right—the nation’s trade had increased 
massively since the Napoleonic Wars and was now heavily dependent on imports, 
while the Royal Navy’s traditional policy of close blockade had been rendered 
untenable by the advent of steam power and the threat to the fleet posed by small, 
fast-moving torpedo boats�8 Charmes argued that commerce campaigns should 
be pursued without pity; it was a tenet of the Jeune École that international law 
had no place in modern war� Despite the ruthlessness of its means, however, 
the Jeune École’s primary aim was to induce not starvation but economic panic, 
From its first days, an alternative school of 
thought has emphasized innovation, new 
operational methods, deception, camouflage, 
joint operations, assaults on rear areas and 
communications, and guerilla methods.
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leading to financial and social upheaval�9 Interestingly, the French navy was 
never to pursue the Jeune École’s recommendations, but during World War I the 
Imperial German Navy would, in addition to its risk-fleet strategy� There were 
strategic differences but operational similarities between what the Jeune École 
recommended and the Germans later implemented, and the latter’s experience 
confirmed many of the Jeune École’s views�10
Alternative Tactics, New Technologies, and Numerical Superiority 
The Jeune École’s first evolution ended when Aube left office in 1887, at which 
time the school’s influence went into temporary decline� The second evolution 
began in the 1890s, when his ideas were taken up by a new generation of young 
naval officers� Underlying both evolutions was the need to deliver naval effect 
with limited budgets� If commerce war and coastal defense—with the emphasis 
on commerce war—were the Jeune École’s alternatives during the first phase, 
its alternative technological focus was on the self-propelled torpedo, married 
to specialized torpedo boats� The Jeune École argued consistently that numbers 
matter and that therefore it was better to build larger numbers of smaller ships 
than to rely on a smaller number of battleships and cruisers—better to replace 
armor and large guns with speed and numerical superiority�11 It was this view that 
led to adoption of the torpedo, because, though in Aube’s time it was still in its 
technological infancy, it could be launched from fast-moving small craft�12 Small 
meant cheap, which translated into large numbers�13 Camouflage and deception 
too were always vital components of the Jeune École’s methods� There was noth-
ing more demoralizing for a battle fleet, Charmes suggested, than to be attacked 
by small, mixed flotillas of gunboats and torpedo boats flitting like “phantoms” 
amidst the confusion of battle�14 
Critically, numerical superiority would not be achieved by a single force op-
erating from a single base� The total force would be distributed in flotilla-sized 
packets across multiple, fortified bases coming together only long enough to 
hit a target before scattering again to elude counterattack� Aube broke from ac-
cepted wisdom when he argued that small boats could be used offensively� An 
exercise conducted while he was minister of marine showed that his confidence 
was largely justified�15 Despite their limitations, small craft were demonstrably 
capable of slipping past any blockade to attack shipping; consequently, commerce 
war in “narrow seas” was a viable option�16
The tactical emphasis during the Jeune École’s second stage switched to coastal 
defense� The torpedo was maturing as a weapon to a degree that the focus by the 
1890s was on small, fast torpedo boats operating in and from the littorals�17 How-
ever, this did not mean commerce war was abandoned� The theory now was that 
rather than attempting to dislocate British trade on the high seas, France could 
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exploit its geographic position (including its position in the Mediterranean) so 
as to fuse commerce war and coastal defense into a single, littoral-war concept�18 
Ship numbers still mattered most, and speed remained important� Aube’s idea of 
ship specialization was retained; the intention was to equip each flotilla with a 
single ship type designated for a single mission�19
Jeune École: Its Effect and Its Legacy 
As the nineteenth century merged into the twentieth, plans that were inspired by 
Jeune École theories but at the same time retained cruisers and much of the tra-
ditional battle fleet, thereby once again making distant guerre de course possible, 
were put forward� They were argued by two senior advocates: Admiral François-
Ernest Fournier, head of the newly established Naval War College, and, later, 
Jean-Louis de Lanessan, the minister of marine from 1899 to 1902� Both called 
for the French navy to be based in multiple locations to force the British to divide 
their blockading forces� Torpedo boats and submarines would harry isolated Brit-
ish units, pushing them farther out to sea� French battleships and cruisers would 
then be able to evade the now-fragmented blockade line and hunt down British 
trade in distant waters� 
In the end, however, time caught up with both the Jeune École and the con-
glomerate strategy of Lanessan� In 1904, Britain and France signed the Entente 
Cordiale�20 The effect on relations was not immediate, but the two countries were 
put on a path that eventually made them allies against Germany, thus removing 
the political and strategic context that had given the Jeune École its rationale� 
Technical developments elsewhere also lessened the torpedo threat, including the 
advent of wireless, steel armor, quick-firing artillery, searchlights, and torpedo 
nets� In Britain, there was now a naval revival, including the building of torpedo 
boat destroyers, specifically to defend the fleet; French morale was undermined 
by its success, compared with France’s own poorly conceived building program� 
Also in France, Aube’s dismissive attitude to international law and public opinion 
was questioned, while the type of fleet the Jeune École concept demanded was 
rejected as too specialized for orthodox conceptions of naval strategy�21
The Jeune École has been maligned by naval practitioners and historians— 
often for partisan reasons—even though it changed contemporary strategy and 
tactics, affected the development of new technologies, and left a tactical legacy 
that remains influential today�22 Admiral Raoul Castex, the early-twentieth-
century French strategic theoretician, was caustic about the school’s ideas and 
what he regarded as the confusion they spread, yet he agreed that its emphasis 
on speed, specialization, and numbers was not misplaced�23 The distinguished 
American historian Theodore Ropp, who also regarded the Jeune École unfa-
vorably, conceded that its ideas represented a genuinely new school of naval 
warfare�24 Technologically, it influenced the development of the torpedo, the 
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submarine, the offensive employment of small craft, and the integration of 
land- and sea-based coastal-defense forces� Tactically, it affected coastal warfare, 
commerce warfare, the exploitation of modern communications to effect the 
dispersal and rapid concentration of force, and the evolution toward what was 
known in France as guerre industrielle and elsewhere as “total war�”
It had perhaps its greatest impact outside France, first and most obviously in 
Germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare campaigns of World Wars I and II� 
But it was the British who, once they recognized that their trade was vulnerable 
and their traditional blockade strategy unworkable, became, in the words of na-
val historian Geoffrey Till, “more worried about these ideas than they cared to 
admit�”25 
FISHER AND FLOTILLA WARFARE
Admiral of the Fleet Sir John “Jackie” Fisher, First Sea Lord 1904–10 and 1914–
15, thought much as Aube had� While his name is linked irrevocably with the 
“dreadnought” capital ship revolution, he argued with all his renowned vigor 
that the Royal Navy should rely on torpedo-equipped flotillas in home waters 
and fast battle cruisers to protect the imperial shipping lanes, rather than on the 
battle fleet as the main instrument of strategic deterrence�26 Fisher’s view in 1905 
was that if torpedo boats were available in sufficient numbers they could make 
the English Channel and the western Mediterranean basin impenetrable to war-
ships within three or four years�27 Like Aube’s, Fisher’s conception depended on 
mass, not individual superiority�28 His vision was one of sea denial, which aims 
to prevent an opponent from using maritime space as it chooses�29 The historian 
Nicholas Lambert suggests it was “a completely new way of thinking�”30 
Sea denial has often been castigated as a strategy of negativity, but in Fisher’s 
view it was the opposite� What made the concept so attractive to him was that he 
could deploy large numbers of relatively cheap surface combatants in “flotillas” 
to patrol the English Channel, the approach to the British Isles that concerned 
him the most� Although access to this strip of water could be effectively denied 
to both sides, as the French would act against British capital ships in the same 
way, this flotilla-based defense would be to Britain’s advantage, because while the 
capital ships and small combatants of both navies were busy holding or denying 
the English Channel, the Royal Navy could deploy its armored cruisers much 
more productively in defense of imperial possessions and trade routes overseas�31 
Far from being tied down, they would be liberated to fulfill their most important 
role� By the end of 1905 the Royal Navy’s Director of Naval Intelligence, Captain 
Charles Ottley, was writing of employing “flotilla defense” from Brest in the west 
to the mouth of the Elbe in the east, thereby also restricting the German navy, 
which operated from bases in and around Wilhelmshaven�32
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Any suspicion that flotilla defense was for Fisher some sort of sideshow is dis-
pelled by his own writings� He wrote that it was a strategy “peculiarly adapted” to 
the defense of the narrow seas and that in terms of his own preparations, “some 
vessels, such, for instance, as torpedo craft and submarines, are wanted sooner 
than others,” because they constituted “the advanced guard and first striking 
force of the whole fleet�”33 It was the submarine that Fisher lauded above all� In 
Fisher’s view the submarine represented a true “revolution” in naval warfare�34 
Many of Fisher’s predictions about the submarine’s effectiveness and the 
threats presented by torpedoes were borne out� The battle of Jutland in 1916 
confirmed what had been plain since 1914—that the High Seas Fleet, Germany’s 
“risk fleet,” was strategically irrelevant unless it was able to sink an isolated 
element of the Royal Navy’s Grand Fleet of sufficient size to erode the latter’s 
overall numerical superiority� The only way the German navy could influence 
the outcome of the war was to use long-range submarines, not cruisers, to sink 
British commerce� The commerce-war strategy that the Jeune École had advanced 
forty years earlier was now brought to fruition, albeit at a technologically more 
advanced level�35
THE SOVIET “YOUNG SCHOOL” 
Like the Jeune École, the Soviet “Young School” (molodaia shkola) was driven 
by the need to maintain a naval capability and capacity in an era of constrained 
resources; in the Soviet case, naval budgets were restricted and shipbuilding 
capability had been crippled by civil war� In France, state resources had been 
directed to the army� In the Soviet Union, the overwhelming priority during the 
interwar years was rapid industrialization, and the army was allocated most of 
what was left� The naval focus accordingly switched to coastal defense, “using an 
integrated system of minefields, coastal artillery, submarines and motor torpedo 
boats,” with the aim of conducting its war at sea “on lines quite novel in maritime 
strategy�”36 Traditionalists were vilified as utterly out of touch�37 
Unlike the Jeune École, however, it was also driven by ideology: its advocates, 
although influenced strongly by the Red Army, clearly worked under Communist 
Party direction�38 The intention was to provide a theoretical underpinning for a 
light and inexpensive naval defensive-deterrent force centered on submarines 
and with only a small number of large ships retained to support them�39 Stripped 
of its Marxist-Leninist terminology, the central tenets of what became known 
(because of its conscious use of ideas drawn from the Jeune École) as the Soviet 
Young School were that the navy existed to guard the army’s seaward flank, that 
it should be refocused on “small war,” that smaller craft and submarines could 
be manufactured quickly and losses could therefore be readily replaced, and that 
the submarine had replaced the battleship as the main striking arm of the fleet�40
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The drive for a proletarian military doctrine that aimed to bring together all 
the arms of state power had begun after the Russian civil war ended in 1921�41 
Despite this political orientation, many members of the old tsarist navy retained 
their positions because of their technical and operational experience� They 
continued to argue that the ability to exert command of the sea as described by 
Mahan was essential for defending the nation’s sea approaches and forcing the 
straits that confined Soviet naval power� Their opponents branded them the “Old 
School�”42 Few in the party understood what these men were talking about; most 
thought they were unrealistic, given the Soviet Union’s parlous financial state�
Admiral Sergey Gorshkov, who was to be the commander in chief of the So-
viet navy from 1956 to 1985, summed up in 1972–73 the changes that took place 
in the 1920s in terms that could have described an updated version of the Jeune 
École: 
The small number of combatant ships available [at the time] necessitated research 
on the strategy and tactics for carrying on defense of our maritime borders with the 
forces of a “small navy” in cooperation with ground forces� � � � Its essence—the de-
livering of quick strikes on the main objective of the enemy without being separated 
from one’s base, with all types of forces secretly concentrated and jointly operating 
from opposite directions � � � [using] surface ships, torpedo boats, submarines, avia-
tion, and coastal artillery organized on mine-artillery positions � � � [—amounted to 
the best use of what resources were available]�43
The thrust of the Young School was blunted by Joseph Stalin� He never en-
dorsed its thinking� In 1928 the Revolutionary Military Council decided to 
create a fleet whose missions were largely coastal and in support of the army�44 
On 27 May 1936 a decision to create a “large sea and ocean fleet” was approved 
instead�45 Stalin’s initiative did not arise from a clear strategic assessment or 
force-planning process� Whatever his reasons were—and the relevant docu-
ments have not emerged—during the second half of the 1930s measures were 
put in hand to build a high-seas fleet�46 Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov, appointed 
commander in chief of the Soviet navy in April 1939, explained in 1965 that this 
building plan coincided with the emergence of a new “Soviet School” that melded 
Young School and Old School thinking, in a manner reminiscent of the changes 
Lanessan had initiated in the French navy in the early 1900s�47 The project was 
stymied, however, because despite successes achieved with tanks and aircraft, 
the sheer size of the shipbuilding program Stalin proposed—which exceeded 1�3 
million tons—was completely beyond what Soviet industry could accomplish�48 
The program was suspended, and shipbuilding hastily focused on coastal vessels 
and submarines once again as cooperation with Germany turned to fears of war 
in the months prior to June 1941�
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The rhetorical impression given is that the large battleships and cruisers Stalin 
wanted would have shifted the navy’s focus from defense to offense and from 
coastal to oceanic waters; the stated strategic aim in 1939 was to achieve sea 
supremacy in the four fleet areas� But there was no definition of why or to what 
end� On one hand, the battleships were quite unsuited to shallow-water opera-
tions, and on the other, no plans have come to light showing how these ships 
would have been deployed oceanically� Kuznetsov was to admit that after talking 
to Stalin late in 1939 he was “not quite clear in [his own] head why they were be-
ing built at all�”49 In retrospect, it would seem that this huge effort—which was 
Stalin’s and Stalin’s alone; no one dared oppose him—was a response to German 
plans (and therefore consistent with interwar arms racing) but was also inspired 
by ideas of Soviet imperium very similar to Hitler’s ambitions for Germany� It 
amounted in the end to nothing more than a vainglorious political statement 
intended to demonstrate that the Soviet Union was capable of building (or buy-
ing) a navy as good as that of any other major power�50 Because Stalin’s building 
program was hastily abandoned, the Soviet navy actually fought World War II as 
a coastal force, supporting the army’s flank�
After World War II Stalin threw naval planning into reverse; instead of return-
ing to his obsession with size, he reined the navy in� In 1948 he said the Soviet 
Union had no need “to protect ocean lines of communications� � � � We need to 
guard the shores and coastal shipping”; in 1950 he criticized naval officers for 
“blindly copying the Americans and the English� � � � We are not thinking about 
conducting ocean battles, but will fight close to our shores�”51 Effectively, what-
ever large ships were available would dilute the navy’s dependence on submarines 
and flotillas of small craft� Nonetheless, the latter would remain the backbone of 
the navy, continuing to operate from fortified coastal bases defended by artillery, 
mines, naval infantry, and fighter aircraft� The large ships would not operate 
oceanically but at a “tactically favorable distance” to retain command of the sea 
in specific areas to deny the enemy its strategic objectives�52 The overall implica-
tion was that the flotilla forces needed to be supplemented by heavier squadron 
forces if the strategically defensive but tactically offensive concept known as “ac-
tive defense” was to be realized�53 
While Nikita Khrushchev, now the Soviet leader, implemented a massive sub-
marine building program starting in 1956, his political weakness (which led to 
his eventual fall from power in 1964) meant that sufficient elements of the Soviet 
School fleet-in-being concept remained to pave the way for the gradual construc-
tion of a fleet capable of more than sea denial�54 But it was to be a fleet that was 
built around the army’s territorially inspired doctrine of “deeply echeloned zones 
of defense,” with three zones—near, far, and open-ocean—that theoretically ex-
tended to the coasts of the Soviet Union’s potential enemies�55
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CHINESE GUERILLA WARFARE GOES TO SEA 
The Chinese navy that emerged following the communist triumph in 1949 had 
much in common with that of the Soviets� Chinese naval developments in the 
1950s were circumscribed by economic constraints similar to those experienced 
by the Soviets in the 1920s and ’30s� As its formal title made clear, the People’s 
Liberation Army Navy was subordinate to the army, as in the Soviet model� Geo-
graphically and ideologically, both China and the USSR were continental powers, 
and both regimes advocated revolutionary war�56 Yet the notion that the Chinese 
navy was essentially a replica of its Soviet counterpart obscures important home-
grown influences�
Chinese strategists clearly possessed their own intellectual agency� Mao Zedong, 
after all, was a towering military theorist in his own right, and his pervasive 
influence reached naval affairs� The similarities between Mao’s strategic thought 
and that of the Soviet Young School may have made some of the imported Soviet 
naval concepts more digestible� But it seems unlikely that the Chinese would have 
unquestioningly privileged foreign ideas over their own thinking�57 Moreover, 
Chinese combat experiences at sea in the 1950s and 1960s produced enduring 
lessons that were peculiar to China’s local circumstances� Similarly, doctrinal 
developments and force modernization were products of thoughtful integration 
of domestic and foreign ideas� The Chinese were by no means unthinking au-
tomatons who borrowed slavishly from their Soviet patrons� 
Glorious History 
The Chinese navy’s operational history, while sparse, has played an important 
role in forming the service’s identity� Official accounts portray the navy’s early 
combat experiences as defining moments� The historiography shows how the 
PLAN beat the odds, prevailing against technologically and materially superior 
adversaries� After the communists won the Chinese civil war, the new regime in 
Beijing faced a grave security situation at sea� The Nationalists (Kuomintang, or 
KMT) were now on Taiwan but still controlled the littorals and occupied numer-
ous strategically located offshore islands� KMT naval units prowled the mainland 
shores, harassing shipping and disrupting coastal communications� Despite 
resource constraints, the Chinese navy improvised and made do with the woe-
fully equipped forces at hand� The PLAN helped dislodge the Nationalists from 
key islands while putting a stop to the KMT’s ability to act with impunity at sea� 
Guerilla thinking, in fact, served the PLAN well during its early years, and Soviet 
Young School ideas fitted in easily�58
The first objective was the Wanshan Islands, which lay astride critical sea lines 
of communications at the mouth of the Pearl River, the epicenter of maritime 
commerce in southern China� In May 1950, the Central Military Commission 
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directed local commanders to “use the small to strike the big and conduct close-
in attack and night attack to bring into full play our forte�”59 In the first sea battle 
of the People’s Republic, Chinese small craft snuck into the main harbor of the 
offshore islands at night and ambushed an enemy flotilla at anchor� In the ensu-
ing melee the communists sank a number of vessels, causing confusion and chaos 
among the surprised Nationalists� In the most important and dramatic encoun-
ter of the attack, a twenty-eight-ton patrol boat severely damaged the 1,200-ton 
KMT flagship� The communists managed to pull off a major upset, opening the 
way for taking the islands� 
China turned next to the Nationalist-occupied Yijiangshan Islands off the 
Zhejiang coast� Prior to launching the famous 1955 Yijiangshan campaign, dur-
ing which the People’s Libera-
tion Army (PLA) successfully 
conducted its first joint am-
phibious operation, Chinese 
forces sought to wrest control 
of the air and seas from the 
KMT� To clear the approaches to Yijiangshan, the communists had to neutral-
ize enemy naval forces, particularly the corvette Taiping, patrolling nearby 
around Dachen Island� The PLAN secretly dispatched four torpedo boats— 
using larger ships to screen their movement—to forward staging areas, where they 
awaited orders for a surprise attack� In the meantime, aerial bombardment against 
Dachen attempted to distract the KMT defenders� When Taiping was detected on 
the night of 14 November 1954, shore-based radar guided the twenty-ton torpedo 
boats to their 1,430-ton target� The hit-and-run torpedo attack sank the much 
larger warship, tilting control of the local waters toward the communists�
The struggle against the Nationalists culminated in a series of sea battles in 
1965� On 6 August six torpedo boats and four fast patrol craft from the PLAN’s 
South Sea Fleet sprang a surprise on the 1,250-ton Jianmen and the 450-ton 
Zhangjiang off the waters of Dongshan Island, near the Fujian–Guangdong pro-
vincial border� The night attack sank both vessels, killing 170 men, including a 
rear admiral, and capturing thirty-three others� The “86 Sea Battle” remains a cel-
ebrated and carefully studied victory in the Chinese navy� Three months later, six 
torpedo boats and six fast patrol craft engaged in another night battle, this time 
against the KMT’s 945-ton Yongchang and 903-ton Yongtai just east of Quanzhou, 
Fujian� After a fierce exchange, a severely damaged Yongtai fled the scene, and 
Yongchang sank from two torpedo hits and follow-on gunfire�60 
These early victories became integral parts of the PLAN’s institutional 
memory� They resonate to this day� The Chinese navy’s handbook for officers 
and enlisted, for example, recounts these feats in a section entitled the “Glorious 
The PLAN’s current naval strategy, which 
enlarges China’s maritime defense perimeter 
farther out to open waters, is an outgrowth of 
rather than a break with its formative period.
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History of the Navy�”61 Such a historical narrative conveys the service’s tradition 
of resourcefulness in the face of adversity� It illustrates the importance of of-
fensive spirit, stratagem, and surprise at sea� It casts China in the role of David 
against the Nationalist Goliath� Chinese campaign histories go to great lengths 
to show how the Nationalist ships vastly exceeded the PLAN’s in displacement� 
But it also sends the message that China must still prepare for conflicts involving 
superior adversaries� The problem of overcoming the power asymmetry between 
weaker and stronger sides is as relevant today as it was six decades ago; it is as rel-
evant for China then and now as it was for France in the late nineteenth century 
and for Russia after the revolution� 
Perhaps more importantly, the navy’s formative experiences highlight the 
influence of the war-fighting traditions of the People’s Liberation Army, forged 
in the brutal, decades-long civil war� The hit-and-run attacks that featured so 
prominently at sea have their antecedents in Mao Zedong’s guerilla warfare� For 
example, writing in Military History, a bimonthly journal of the Academy of 
Military Science, Zhou Lingui praises the nascent Chinese navy for transposing 
guerilla tactics to the maritime domain� “At the time,” Zhou observes, “the vast 
majority of the naval troops and officers originated from the army, boasting rich 
operational experiences on land� Consciously or unconsciously, they applied 
those valuable lessons from guerilla warfare on land to combat at sea�”62 The au-
thors of a study extolling the continuing relevance of Mao’s military theories in 
the twenty-first century credit the chairman for inspiring the early naval actions 
of the 1950s and ’60s� Mao’s people’s war concept, they contend, helped “create 
such tactics as rely on islands and shores, close-in fighting and night fighting, 
sea-air coordination, shore-ship coordination, near seas annihilation, and small 
boats fighting large ships�”63
Sabotage Warfare at Sea
The pressing Nationalist threat in the first half of the 1950s compelled the PLAN 
to take action� The operational principles behind the engagements at sea were 
largely implicit� Formal operational guidance did not emerge until the mid-
1950s� Practice had to come before theory� At length, in March 1956, the Central 
Military Commission issued military strategic guidance under the rubric of “ac-
tive defense, defend the motherland�” “Active defense,” a concept that Mao devel-
oped and refined in the 1930s, called for the employment of offensive operations 
and tactics to achieve strategically defensive goals� The navy’s role was to support 
the army and the air force against the enemy on land� Under active defense, the 
PLAN’s missions were to
conduct joint counter landing operations with ground and air forces; wreck the 
enemy’s sea lines of communications, severing the supply of materiel and manpower; 
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weaken and annihilate the enemy’s seaborne transport tools and combat vessels; 
jointly operate with ground forces in contests over key points and locations along the 
coast; guarantee the security of our coastal base system and strategic locations; sup-
port ground forces in littoral flanking operations; act in concert with ground forces to 
recover offshore islands and all territories�64
In 1957, Admiral Xiao Jinguang, the first commander of the PLAN (1950–79), 
more systematically developed operational guidance for the Chinese navy� Xiao, 
a Long March veteran and a corps commander of the Fourth Field Army during 
the Chinese civil war, was an army officer, with no training or background in na-
val affairs� He and many of his comrades had to adapt quickly to an entirely new 
operational domain in which China’s adversaries, the Nationalists aided by the 
United States, seemed to hold an upper hand� It was therefore not surprising that 
Xiao applied what he knew best to his new task of leading the PLAN� 
After consulting Mao Zedong’s military writings from the 1920s and 1930s 
and those of Soviet experts, Xiao articulated the operational concept of “sabotage 
warfare at sea” (海上破袭战)� Confronted with better-armed enemies, he under-
stood that China was in no position to fight them head-on� Drawing on his own 
battlefield experiences, the admiral reasoned that inferior Chinese forces had 
to “use suddenness and sabotage and guerilla tactics to unceasingly attack and 
destroy the enemy, accumulate small victories in place of big wins, fully leverage 
and bring into play our advantageous conditions, exploit and create unfavorable 
conditions for the enemy, and implement protracted war�”65 Mao would have 
instantly recognized these ideas as his own� 
Four key features characterized Xiao’s sabotage warfare at sea� First, it called 
for the use of all available weaponry to deliver all possible types of attacks against 
the enemy� Second, it emphasized covert action and sudden surprise attacks to 
overpower unsuspecting or unprepared adversaries, so as to seize the initiative� 
Third, it required offensive campaigns and tactics to assault unceasingly the ef-
fective strength of the enemy� Fourth, it demanded the agile use of troops and 
combat styles to preserve one’s own forces while annihilating the opponent� 
Xiao essentially codified what his forces had practiced out of sheer necessity in 
previous years� In contrast to a “naval strategy” as such, seeking to align avail-
able means with larger political aims, the admiral furnished a concept that was 
largely operational and tactical in nature� Xiao, in essence, identified methods 
for winning battles� 
Surprise, deception, unorthodox methods, offensive spirit, and small incre-
mental victories were essential to Xiao’s conception of naval battle� According to 
the PLAN’s encyclopedia, sabotage warfare at sea involved 
offensive operations at sea in which naval forces employ destructive and surprise 
attacks against the enemy� It is also known as guerrilla warfare or irregular warfare at 
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sea� It is a combat style that relies on small groups of naval forces to carry out covert 
surprise attacks� � � � To achieve the operational objectives, it uses unconventional 
combat methods to attack the enemy’s critical targets� In coordination with conven-
tional operations on the strategic and campaign levels, it seeks to annihilate, weaken, 
deplete, tire out, and divide the enemy in order to pin down the enemy or throw into 
confusion the enemy’s deployment of forces�66
Opportunism suffused the concept� Sabotage warfare at sea sought to ex-
ploit China’s complex maritime geography, notably the convoluted eighteen- 
thousand-kilometer (eleven-thousand-mile) coastline and the offshore islands 
that dot the approaches to the mainland� Chinese naval forces could use the 
shorelines and islands to disperse and hide, to await orders, to deploy and rede-
ploy, to launch and coordinate attacks, and to operate under the cover of shore-
based artillery and naval aviation�67 The intended targets of such sabotage were 
vulnerable transport vessels, isolated warships, and poorly defended naval bases 
and ports� The specific tactics to destroy such military objects included rapid 
raids with high-speed vessels and aircraft, minelaying, hunter-killer submarine 
operations, and sneak attacks after infiltration of enemy ports� In keeping with 
Mao’s people’s war, conventional forces would be supported by fishermen and the 
coastal population� 
Xiao’s operational concept provided an important organizing principle around 
which the Chinese navy could employ tactics and develop weaponry� To Zuo 
Liping of the Naval Military Studies Research Institute, sabotage warfare at sea 
was “a type of innovation in military theory�” “The navy,” Zuo claims, “not only 
combined research with actual combat experience, but it also provided a naval 
theory with Chinese characteristics� The development of sabotage warfare at sea 
as operational guidance represented a type of naval thought that was highly stra-
tegic and comprehensive�”68 Note that Zuo describes the theory as an operational 
framework rather than a strategic one� It is important to reemphasize, therefore, 
that Xiao offered a tactical solution for the weaker side at sea� But his approach 
left largely unanswered how the navy would serve China’s foreign-policy and 
longer-term strategic objectives� 
While China’s own theorizing and its hard-won lessons at sea informed the 
PLAN’s operational doctrine, a major source of early communist naval think-
ing was undoubtedly the Soviet Union� In August 1950, Admiral Xiao convened 
the first navy conference to discuss the future development and direction of 
the PLAN� To Xiao, ideological kinship as well as access to technology and 
know-how made the Soviet navy a logical, politically correct partner� As he later 
observed, “Especially for our navy, which was starting from scratch, it was no 
good to lean on our own experiences and to grope about by ourselves� Only by 
learning well and borrowing from others’ advanced experiences could we quickly 
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build up a powerful navy that was modern and conventional�”69 Attesting to the 
importance attached to cooperation with the Soviet Union, Xiao in April 1952 
led the first delegation to Moscow to negotiate the purchase of naval weaponry� 
After several rounds of talks, the two sides agreed to a major transfer of warships 
and submarines in June 1953� In the meantime, Soviet consultants and experts 
rotated through the Dalian Naval Academy� Between 1949 and 1960, nearly 3,400 
advisers visited the PLAN�
Even so, Xiao’s memoir acknowledges that considerable debate divided his 
subordinates over the initial decision to depend on the Soviets� On one side, 
former Nationalist naval officers who had defected to the communists during 
the civil war argued that access to Western, particularly British and American, 
technologies should not be written off� On the other side, doctrinaire adherents 
of people’s war contended that they had more to learn from their own civil-war 
experiences than from foreign powers� The resistance to Soviet technology and 
naval ideas came from continentalist cadres who favored strong land forces and 
whose faith in Mao’s people’s war doctrine was almost mystical� The argument 
in China thus bore noticeable similarities to the debate that had raged between 
the Old and Young Schools in the Soviet Union during the 1930s� The Chinese 
continentalists, like the Soviet political leaders before them, applied their mind-
set to naval affairs� 
Xiao himself opposed blind adoption of all things Soviet� He insisted that the 
Chinese navy had to be selective, rejecting Soviet ways that were unsuited to 
China’s unique, local conditions� To him it was plain that the PLAN could draw 
technological and institutional lessons from the Soviets� But it was imperative for 
the service to stick to its own traditions on such important matters as political 
indoctrination� 
“Naval Aviation, Submarines, Fast Attack Craft”
Xiao’s landmark meeting in August 1950 produced a lasting effect on the Chinese 
navy’s force structure� The nation’s dismal economic, industrial, and technologi-
cal conditions limited the navy’s ambitions and options, as had been the case for 
the navies of France and the Soviet Union� Analogously, the PLAN clearly could 
not stand up to the modern navies of the West on a symmetrical basis� Also, the 
immediate Nationalist danger, much closer to home, dictated the scope of naval 
modernization� In summarizing the findings of the conference, Xiao concluded, 
“With an eye toward long-term development and departing from the current 
situation, we will build light combat power at sea that is modern and offensive 
in nature� We need to first organize and develop our current capabilities and, on 
the foundation of those current capabilities, develop torpedo boats, submarines, 
and naval aviation to gradually build a strong, national navy�”70 
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Xiao’s call for surface, undersea, and air forces reflected an early apprecia-
tion of the character of naval warfare� “Modern sea battle,” he declared in 1950, 
“is necessarily a kind of three-dimensional war and is a kind of composite war� 
We must use the aircraft above the waves, the warships on the sea’s surface, the 
submarines in the water, and artillery along the coast to form a synergy of in-
tegrated power� In war, the lack of any one of those capabilities could well spell 
disaster�”71 The offshore engagements of the 1950s and 1960s amply validated the 
importance of mutual support between surface forces and shore-based weaponry� 
Xiao’s directive—commonly known as “kong [空], qian [潜], kuai [快],” Chinese 
shorthand for “naval aviation, submarines, fast attack craft”—set the course for 
the PLAN’s buildup over the next two decades� 
Initially, torpedo boats were imported from the Soviet Union or constructed 
in Chinese shipyards from Soviet designs and parts� In the 1960s, local industry 
began to deliver more ship types, also of Soviet origin� Frigates, submarine chas-
ers, minesweepers, guided-missile fast attack craft, torpedo boats, patrol boats, 
diesel-electric submarines, and shore-based tactical bombers joined the fleet� 
The PLAN fielded large numbers of small craft and submarines, particularly 
the Type 021 Huangfeng guided-missile boats and the Type 033 Romeo-class 
submarines, while slighting larger surface combatants and naval aviation� These 
added capabilities constituted the light naval force that Xiao set forth in 1950� 
They were well suited for coastal combat marked by speed, concealment, mobil-
ity, and offensive punch� 
From the Lost Years to “Near-Seas Defense” 
The Chinese navy’s early operational history, the doctrine of sabotage warfare 
at sea, and the buildup that began in the 1950s produced legacies that proved 
stubbornly resistant to change� Moreover, external shocks and strategic decisions 
helped entrench the status quo� For one thing, the chaos of the Cultural Revolu-
tion in the 1960s and 1970s severely disrupted the modernization process� For 
another, Mao’s determination to pursue an undersea nuclear deterrent strained 
resources while diverting attention from conventional forces� China thus strug-
gled to remake its light, coastal-force posture� 
Despite some important developments for the Chinese navy in the 1970s, 
including the introduction of the Type 051 Luda-class guided-missile destroyer 
and the Type 091 Han-class nuclear attack submarine, obsolescent platforms 
composed the bulk of the navy� The naval service overproduced outdated ships 
and submarines and neglected new research and development projects� Single-
mission platforms that lacked organic self-defense weapons and nonexistent 
coordination between combat arms hobbled the PLAN� The limited range of 
shore-based airpower, on which surface units depended for protection against air 
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and submarine threats, confined naval operations to two hundred nautical miles 
from mainland shores�72 In short, the Chinese navy lacked the ability to wage the 
type of “three-dimensional war” that Xiao had envisioned two decades before� 
Worse, the problems would persist for decades�
Naval doctrine too was stuck in the past� In the 1960s, ’70s, and early ’80s little 
had changed since the 1950s� According to Shi Xiaoqin, a naval analyst at the 
Academy of Military Science,
the main mission was to exploit the risks inherent to transiting straits to delay, to the 
extent possible, the initial offensives of the enemy’s navy� Once the delaying phase 
ended, there would be a transition to positional defensive warfare for holding ac-
tions along the coast together with guerilla warfare at sea in the enemy’s rear� [These 
operations] all emphasized reliance on islands and shores, set-piece battlefields, and 
reliance on support from all types of shore-based weaponry and firepower in order 
to bring about bastion defense� Surprise attacks against the enemy’s rear communica-
tions constituted the main form of guerilla warfare at sea�73 
Outmoded doctrine and bloated force structure reinforced each other, in a vi-
cious cycle� This state of affairs would persist until Admiral Liu Huaqing became 
the PLAN’s commander (1982–87)� Much has already been written in the West 
about Liu’s central role in advancing the concept of “near-seas defense” (or “off-
shore defense”), and no reprise of the existing literature will be attempted here�74 
It is worth noting, however, that the near-seas defense strategy remains the bed-
rock for the Chinese navy� It is therefore an important concept, one that bridges 
the PLAN’s doctrinal past, present, and future� The PLAN encyclopedia states, 
[Near-seas defense involves] the combined use of all kinds of methods to exercise the 
overall effects of maritime power to preserve oneself to the maximum extent while 
unceasingly exhausting and annihilating the attacking enemy� It requires a sufficient 
grasp of mobile combat capabilities to search and destroy the enemy, gradually shift 
the power balance, change the strategic situation, and thereby appropriately time the 
transition to the strategic counter offensive and attack�75
The concept of near-seas defense articulated a long-term, regionally oriented 
strategy that enlarged China’s maritime defense perimeter, extending the Chinese 
navy’s area of operations much farther from mainland shores in a series of ech-
elons in a manner that reflected earlier Soviet thinking� Instead of fighting the 
enemy in China’s coastal waters, the PLAN aimed to keep the opponent at arm’s 
length while shielding from attack important political and economic centers on 
the seaboard� In contrast to sabotage warfare at sea, which sought to tie up or 
slow down enemy forces, near-seas defense would defeat and roll back the enemy 
offensive� Instead of pinpricks and hit-and-run attacks with small forces, more-
substantial and organized formations would be involved in naval engagements� 
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In contrast to its previous subordination to the army and role as an adjunct to 
land operations, the navy would enjoy greater scope for action as an independent, 
strategic service� 
Yet the strategy did not grow out of a vacuum� It was (and remains) anchored 
in long-standing strategic principles� For example, Liu insisted that near-seas 
defense conformed to the strategic guidance of active defense� It would employ 
offensive means for strategically defensive goals, including such core interests as 
national unity, territorial integrity, and maritime rights� At the same time, near-
seas defense continues to assume that China will fight from a position of material 
weakness� To close the gap in naval power, offensive action would be employed 
aggressively to grind down the enemy� Over time, an accumulation of such at-
tacks would shift the naval balance, perhaps decisively, in China’s favor, affording 
the PLAN the opportunity to go on the offensive� The sequence of events paral-
lels the famous three phases in Mao’s protracted-war concept that envisioned a 
similar reversal of fortunes between the enemy and the communists� 
Moreover, sabotage warfare was not abandoned outright� Rather, it was sub-
sumed into the new, larger strategic concept� In a retrospective of China’s naval 
strategy during the era of “paramount leader” Deng Xiaoping, Liu Zhongmin of 
the Ocean University of China explicitly points to positional, mobile, and guerilla 
warfare in tracing the lineage of near-seas defense back to Mao’s revolutionary 
era�76 To Liu, the strategy closely links naval operations farther from shore to 
combat on land and near the coastline, tethering the navy to homeland defense� 
With more symmetrical, conventional forces operating at the outer limits of 
China’s maritime defense perimeter, sabotage warfare would presumably play a 
subsidiary but no less important role in rear areas close to shore� 
ECHOES OF THE PAST
Chinese analysts continue to look back to their strategic traditions for guidance 
about future wars at sea� Quan Jinfu and Chen Ming, two professors from China’s 
Naval Command College, call on the PLAN to prepare for “naval strategic opera-
tions,” which they define as “operations employing naval power to fulfill objec-
tives of the war at sea that greatly influence the war as a whole�” To them, naval 
combat would assume such familiar forms as mobile warfare at sea, positional 
warfare at sea, and sabotage guerilla warfare at sea, concepts drawn directly from 
Mao’s writings�77 Similarly, Wang Zheng at the Chinese National Defense Univer-
sity argues that future wars under “informatized conditions” would use methods 
that would have been familiar to guerilla fighters in the 1930s� Wang declares 
that the People’s Liberation Army must seek to “trap the enemy in the vast seas 
of people’s war with special operations, sabotage warfare, and guerilla warfare at 
sea using high-technology weapons deep behind enemy lines�”78 
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Admiral Xiao’s early emphasis on aircraft, submarines, and fast attack craft is 
still visible in the force structures of the PLAN and its sister services� Between 
2000 and 2012, China’s fleet of attack submarines increased eightfold, from five 
boats to forty�79 This modern undersea force can launch antiship cruise missiles 
(ASCMs) while submerged, posing a potent threat to surface forces� Assuming 
that the likely course of an oncoming enemy fleet could be anticipated, these 
submarines would transit to 
firing positions in advance 
and wait for the right time to 
spring an ambush� With the 
aid of off-board sensors and 
targeting systems, dispersed 
PLAN submarines could fire coordinated, multivector missile salvos to surprise 
the adversary at a distance�80 
The analogue to the PLAN’s light torpedo forces of the 1950s is the large fleet 
of Type 022 Houbei fast attack craft� According to Nan Li of the Naval War Col-
lege in Newport, Rhode Island, “The Type 022 � � � represents a continuation of 
the PLAN’s historical ethos as a successful, small-ship navy that is able to take on 
adversaries with potentially more substantial deployments�”81 Armed with long-
range antiship cruise missiles, these wave-piercing catamarans pack a punch�82 
The stealthy hull structure, high speed, and small size of the Houbeis make them 
ideal platforms for evading enemies and launching surprise attacks in offshore 
waters� With at least sixty boats in service, the PLAN may be well positioned to 
launch coordinated saturation missile volleys to overpower fleet defenses�83 The 
Type 022s could form wolf packs to conduct the hit-and-run tactics envisioned 
in sabotage warfare at sea� 
Notably, Chinese analysts continue to extol the value of the submarine and fast 
attack craft as maritime guerilla forces� An extensive study on the twenty-first-
century relevance of fast attack craft envisions large numbers of small modern 
combatants in the near seas providing support to the larger surface fleet operat-
ing in the far seas�84 Three analysts from the Navy Engineering College propose 
“maritime swarming warfare” in future wars at sea, a concept that would fit very 
well with the Type 022� Surprise attacks, ambushes, concealment, and deception 
would characterize swarming tactics�85 Similarly, two researchers at the Naval 
Command College have invoked “guerilla warfare tactics” on numerous occasions 
to illustrate how modern attack submarines could engage carrier strike groups�86 
China’s land-based air and missile forces can potentially influence events at 
sea independently or in conjunction with Chinese surface and undersea forces� 
The PLAN’s air arm fields shore-based fixed-wing aircraft that could fire ASCMs� 
Notably, the Su-30MKK multirole fighter and the H-6 medium-range bomber 
An alternative school of naval thought, one 
rooted in coastal defense, follows an asymmet-
ric path intended to enable the weak to take 
down the strong.
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can threaten surface ships cruising well east of the “first island chain” (running 
generally from Kamchatka through Japan, the Ryukyus, and the northern Philip-
pines to Borneo)� Massed formations of such maritime strike aircraft armed with 
long-range ASCMs could conceivably deliver concentrated blows to overwhelm 
enemy fleet defenses� 
The antiship ballistic missile (ASBM)—a maneuverable ballistic weapon 
capable of hitting moving targets at sea—of the Second Artillery Corps, China’s 
strategic missile force, is perhaps the ultimate technical expression of shore-based 
firepower� With a range reportedly exceeding eight hundred nautical miles, the 
truck-mounted missile joins an extended family of ship-killing missiles that can 
be fired from submarines, ships, and aircraft� Whether it will perform as adver-
tised has been a subject of intense debate, but its existence is an unmistakable sign 
that the Chinese are seeking to hold at risk an enemy’s surface fleet with as many 
maritime strike options as possible�
A hypothetical Sino-U�S� war at sea perhaps best illustrates how the sabotage 
warfare of the 1950s might still take place in the twenty-first century� Tactically, 
China would seek to engage and interdict American naval forces at the maximum 
effective ranges that its weaponry would permit� Antiship ballistic missiles and 
long-range aircraft could deliver the first blows: ASBM raids and massed forma-
tions of maritime strike aircraft armed with long-range ASCMs could conceiv-
ably punch through a U�S� fleet’s defenses� Such shore-based firepower allows 
China to deliver ordnance on an American carrier strike group directly from the 
mainland well before it could get close enough to shore to retaliate in kind with 
its combat aircraft� As the U�S� fleet approached the Chinese seaboard it would 
then encounter lurking ASCM-armed submarines, stealthy fast attack craft, and 
other units armed with shorter-range missiles� Resistance would become stiffest 
and deadliest in this inner ring of China’s defense, where sabotage warfare involv-
ing high-tech guerilla tactics would most likely be employed� 
DISCERNING CHANGE AND CONTINUITY
Yet there is no denying that change is afoot� The PLA Navy has grown rapidly 
from a coastal-defense force composed of largely obsolescent Soviet-era technol-
ogies into a modern naval service� Over the past two decades, multiple classes of 
China’s major surface combatants—notably the Type 052D Luyang III destroyer, 
the Type 054A Jiangkai II frigate, and the Type 056 Jiangdao corvette—have 
entered serial production, adding mass and balance to the fleet� The buildup of 
such warships has accelerated since 2008� China’s first aircraft carrier, Liaoning, 
joined the fleet in 2012� Only twenty years have elapsed since China began to 
construct and import modern frontline fighting ships� This is an impressive feat 
by any standard�
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At the same time, the PLAN appears to be pursuing an even more outward-
looking naval strategy� While the most recent defense white papers insist that 
the Chinese navy’s primary task remains near-seas defense, the 2009 and 2011 
editions explicitly acknowledge the need for the PLAN to operate in the “far 
seas�” The 2013 report calls on the Chinese navy to “enhance far seas mobile op-
erations�” While the geographic scope of the far seas has been subject to varying 
interpretations, actual Chinese naval operations in recent years suggest that the 
term likely encompasses “a vast area that stretches from the northwest Pacific to 
the east Indian Ocean�”87 It has become commonplace for Chinese naval flotil-
las to sail through the narrow seas of the Ryukyu island chain and cruise in the 
open waters of the western Pacific� The PLAN has also dispatched naval escorts 
on antipiracy missions in the Gulf of Aden on an uninterrupted basis since 
December 2008� 
The Chinese navy is thus at once posturing itself to conduct defense-in-depth 
operations to protect the homeland from seaborne attack and moving toward 
a more expeditionary, blue-water force� The Janus-faced character of Chinese 
naval power at present suggests that critical decisions loom in the future� As Shi 
Xiaoqin persuasively argues, the Chinese navy will soon have to reassess both its 
strategic thinking and its force structure� Whether sabotage warfare at sea should 
give way to symmetrical naval engagements and whether a carrier-centered fleet 
should replace a submarine-oriented one are questions of growing urgency for 
the PLAN� “Clearly,” Shi concludes, “the Chinese navy stands at a crossroad�”88
If Shi is right, the PLAN’s force structure, strategy, and institutional iden-
tity could follow any of several distinct pathways� First, China could, over time, 
construct a navy that resembles the Anglo-American model of sea power� In 
this case, the PLAN would gradually shed its small-ship ethos and capabilities� 
Second, China could continue to focus on force modernization and doctrinal 
development aimed at keeping hostile powers out of its backyard� Expeditionary 
forces would be subordinated to this primary defensive task, while conducting 
lesser included missions in distant waters during peacetime� Third, a two-tiered 
force could coexist, perhaps uneasily, within the PLAN, though whether China 
could afford or sustain a navy along two parallel tracks remains to be seen� As 
the Chinese navy evolves in the coming years, it will have to grapple with these 
fundamental choices on force structure and naval thought� 
The purpose here is not to predict what the precise outcome will be� The fore-
going analysis suggests that past may well be prologue� China’s formative experi-
ences and guerilla ethos appear quite durable and applicable in the twenty-first 
century� At the very least, China’s concept of sabotage warfare at sea provides 
a baseline by which to measure the degree of continuity and change in future 
Chinese naval strategy� At the same time, the evolution of various incarnations of 
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the Young School impulse in the West points to a universal logic with respect to 
the naval strategy of the weaker side� Owing to asymmetries in sea power, China 
would have likely gravitated to Xiao’s war-fighting doctrines even in the absence 
of Soviet and Maoist influences� It is also worth acknowledging that China’s naval 
future will not likely follow in lockstep the French and Soviet experiences—the 
political and economic conditions that shaped naval thought in France, the So-
viet Union, and China were too different, notwithstanding clear similarities� The 
impressive trajectory of China’s comprehensive national power could furnish Bei-
jing options comparable in ambitiousness to the Anglo-American model of sea 
power, options of which French and Soviet strategists could only have dreamed� 
Despite these uncertainties, what is clear is that this alternative school of 
thought stands quite apart from the British and American ways of naval warfare� 
From its very first days, it has emphasized technological innovation, pursuit of 
new operational methods, deception, camouflage, joint operations transcending 
the land-sea divide, assaults on rear areas and lines of communications, and gue-
rilla methods� It is a view of the sea that is essentially territorial and consequently 
alien to the Anglo-American understanding of naval warfare� The Chinese thus 
likely think differently from adherents of the Anglo-American tradition about 
naval strategy and will likely fight differently at sea� Whereas French and Soviet 
naval thought emerged as a response to austerity and then faded, in Chinese 
hands the alternative approach to naval warfare has continued, and the innova-
tion and technology it demands have been fully funded� It thus behooves Western 
policy makers and strategists to keep a steady eye on China’s turn to the seas� 
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